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Commodity Index Investing: Investigating the Relationship between Commodity Index 
Investment Flows and Futures Prices Using a Non-linear Granger Causality Approach 
Filip Rusescu 
 
The appearance in the late 1990s of commodity index investing funds and the increasing 
popularity of commodities as an asset class has led numerous market participants and 
academics to blame index investing for creating an artificial demand for commodities and thus 
to inflate commodity prices. While the issue has been widely discussed and attracted a lot of 
attention from academics, previous research focused on correlation analysis and linear Granger 
causality tests to investigate whether commodity index investing had a significant impact on 
commodity prices. While linear Granger causality tests have been widely used in empirical 
finance and econometrics and are standard tools in an econometrician’s toolbox, most recent 
research has focused on developing non-linear, non parametric tests. In this study I take a new 
approach to testing the hypothesis that commodity index investing Granger caused commodity 
futures prices to increase by using the test proposed by Diks and Panchenko (2006) which uses a 
non-linear non-parametric framework. I perform both the linear Granger causality and the Diks 
and Panchenko tests for 12 agricultural markets for which index commodity investing data is 
available from the CFTC, for the period 2006 to 2012. Overall, the empirical results provide 
limited evidence to support the hypothesis that index commodity investing caused a spike in 
commodity prices but highlight the importance of considering non-linear effects in empirical 
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I  Introduction 
 
The first modern organized futures exchange started as early as 1710 with a rice contract 
at the Dojima Rice Exchange in Japan (West, (2000)). Futures contracts are often seen as an 
evolution of the forward contract in which two parties agree on the price, quantity and delivery 
date of a commodity or other product. The additional security of trading on an exchange with 
standardized contracts and with a clearinghouse which acts as an intermediary to minimize the 
risk of counterparty default attracted many commodity producers and users. Another advantage 
of a futures contract comes from its liquidity, as numerous financial third parties, often labelled 
as speculators, provide the necessary volume and immediacy to respond to a commodity 
producer’s or end user’s needs. In 1865 the first standardized futures contracts were introduced 
on the Chicago Board of Trade only 17 years after its creation. Over time, futures contracts 
became increasingly popular and are now represented in numerous markets including financial 
products, currencies etc. 
In 2012, approximately 1.3 billion agricultural futures and options contracts exchanged 
hands. Agricultural futures markets are under the scrutiny of regulators and politicians, and 
their participants have often been accused of price manipulation, excessive speculation and 
blamed for creating instability in commodity prices, as well as social instability and hunger in 
certain parts of the world. 
While financial intermediaries have been present in commodity futures markets since the 
beginning, commodity index investing is a relatively new phenomenon. Although the first 
commodity price index appeared in 1957 in the US, the use of commodity price indices as an 
investment class came much later, as the Prudent Man rule prevented pension plans and other 
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trustees (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) from investing in risky or speculative assets 
such as commodities. As the Uniform Prudent Investor Act was adopted in 1992 (American Law 
Institute's Third Restatement of the Law of Trusts (Restatement of the Law Third, 1992)) 
fiduciaries were allowed to invest in such asset classes, reflecting modern portfolio theory and 
the concepts of total portfolio risk and return. As such, investing in futures contracts was no 
longer expressly prohibited as long as it allowed fiduciaries to hedge or minimize their overall 
portfolio risk. Masters and White (2008a) argue that pension funds and other investors, who 
had invested heavily in equity markets in the 1990s and who, in the aftermath of the tech 
bubble burst, the 9/11 attacks and the following mini-recession were shifting their asset 
allocations away from equities and often into “alternative” asset classes were being marketed 
commodities index investments as providing equity-like returns while being uncorrelated with 
equities thus reducing overall portfolio risk. Whether Wall Street banks convinced pension funds 
to invest in commodity markets or pension funds by themselves decided to invest heavily in 
commodities as an alternative asset class is subject to debate. What is certain however is that 
commodity assets under management increased from under $10 billion at the beginning of the 
2000’s to over $400 billion in 2012 according to data compiled by Barclays. Over the same 
period, commodity prices increased significantly, which led numerous market participants to 
claim that index investing was creating a bubble in commodity prices. 
In the US, the Commodity Exchange act, which was passed in 1936 and amended several 
times, regulates the trading of commodity futures. The 1936 act established speculative position 
limits in order to prevent excessive speculative trading activity that could destabilize commodity 
markets and create price bubbles. In 1974 the US Congress amended the act and created the 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) which replaced the Commodity Exchange 
Authority as a regulator and whose mission is to “to protect market users and the public from 
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fraud, manipulation, abusive practices and systemic risk related to derivatives that are subject to 
the Commodity Exchange Act, and to foster open, competitive, and financially sound markets.” 
However, in 1991 the CFTC approved commercial exemptions to position limits for swap 
dealers, the rationale being that these dealers would not be able to manipulate the market, 
given that their transactions in the futures market were made purely to offset their over the 
counter swaps transactions. It has often been argued (Masters, others) that this eventually 
allowed speculators to circumvent position limits by entering into over the counter swaps with 
banks. 
In the new millennium, commodity investing increased dramatically thanks in part to new 
products targeted at both institutional and retail investors which offered an easy , convenient, 
and hassle free way of participating in the commodities markets. New products included 
Exchange Traded Funds, Exchange Traded Notes, and commodity index swaps and options. 
From January 2002 to June 2008, the Standard & Poor’s – Goldman Sachs Commodity Index and 
the Dow Jones – UBS Commodity Index, the two most popular commodity indices, increased 
398% and 159% respectively, which led certain observers decry a commodity bubble. As the 
financial crisis of 2008 eventually burst the commodity bubble, many market participants, 
regulators and academics eventually looked into the problem, trying to determine whether 
commodity index investing was really the driving force behind the 2007-2008 spike in 
commodity prices. 
Determining whether commodity index investors have an impact on commodity futures 
markets is important because commodity prices are at the bottom of the value creation chain 
and their correct functioning is a prerequisite for economic stability. If commodity index 
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investors destabilize commodity futures markets, regulators should react quickly and impose 
position limits or implement other measures to limit the impact of index investing. 
After discussing the various arguments for and against commodity index investing 
impacting returns in the commodities markets and conducting a literature review on the 
subject, I will discuss the theoretical framework and history behind causality testing and argue 
for the advantage of using a non-linear framework, more specifically the recently developed 
Diks and Panchenko test, which provides a more robust non-parametric, non-linear approach to 
causality resting.   
While the notion of causality is rather large and discussions around the definition of 
causality have been central to philosophical debates since antiquity, in empirical research 
causality is typically looked at as the relationship between an event or series of events (the 
cause) which cause or produce another event or series of events (the effect). A key notion 
central to the concept of causality is that the cause occurs prior to the effect. In time series 
analysis, causality testing typically involves what is commonly referred to as Granger causality 
testing in which a time series is said to Granger cause another one if past values of the first time 
series improve the ability to predict the second time series. Although Granger causality does not 
prescribe the use of a linear model to test for its presence, in practice, almost all Granger 
causality testing is conducted through the use of linear regressions, in which a time series is 
regressed against past values of itself and against past values of itself and of the presumed 
causer series. If the second regression provides a significantly better prediction than the first 
regression then one concludes that the second time series is Granger causing the first. Note that 
all previous research that looked at the impact of commodity index funds on commodity futures 
and used Granger causality testing, did so using linear regressions. Although widespread, the 
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problem with linear Granger causality testing is that it assumes a linear relationship between 
the two time series and if this is not the case, it can fail to detect a causal relationship or lead to 
concluding that a causal relationship exists when it actually does not. Note that there is nothing, 
at least in theory, that would justify the use of a linear model in testing for causal relationships 
between index investing and returns in commodity futures markets, simplicity aside. Actually, 
given the large price swings in commodity futures markets and the high volatility observed in 
general in these markets, linear models are clearly not suitable to describe relationships 
between investment flows and returns. Given the recent advances in non-linear methods, I 
advocate that such a method should be used for the purposes of investigating the impact of 
index investing on commodity futures markets. The advantage of a non-linear approach such as 
the test proposed by Diks and Panchenko (2006) used in this study is obvious: since it makes no 
assumption on the underlying relationship between the time series it does not suffer from any 
model restriction. The Diks and Panchenko test is a non-parametric test for Granger non-
causality which was shown to have good size and power characteristics in Monte-Carlo 
simulations. To uncover the importance of considering a non-linear approach to causality 
testing, especially with financial time series, I compare the standard linear Granger causality test 
to the Diks and Panchenko test. I apply the following Granger causality tests to the weekly 
change in commodity index traders’ positions as a percentage of total open interest and to the 
weekly returns time series for 12 agricultural futures markets. First, the Diks and Panchenko test 
is applied to the residuals of the Vector Autoregression (“VAR”) models used with the linear test.  
Second, the Diks and Panchenko test is applied directly to the weekly change in commodity 
index traders’ positions as a percentage of total open interest and to the weekly returns time 
series. Evidence of non-linear effects is found in both cases, which justifies the use of a non-
linear approach to Granger causality testing in this situation. 
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The study is organized as follows: Chapter II reviews the literature and various arguments 
advanced by advocates and critics of the view that index investing inflated commodity prices 
and discusses new non-linear approaches to causality testing. Chapter III describes the 
theoretical framework used in this study. Chapter IV discusses the underlying data, 
methodology used and describes and interprets the results and Chapter V concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The relationship between returns and traders’ positions 
 
The question of whether the positions of different categories of traders influence 
commodity market prices or if market prices cause investment inflows has been widely 
researched by academics and discussed by policymakers over the last few decades and 
continues to be an important subject of debate today.  Most studies rely on the CFTC’s 
Commitments of Traders (“COT”) reports and its more recent improvements such the 
Disaggregated Commitments of Traders report and the Supplemental Commitments of Traders 
report to address this issue. 
A number of authors have reported evidence of a consistent ability of large futures 
traders or certain groups or traders to make profitable trades (Houthakker (1957), Rockwell 
(1967), Leuthold et al. (1994)). However there is no general consensus that a particular category 
of traders can consistently make profitable trades and that just by looking at their positions one 
could have an advantage in forecasting future prices. Kahn (1986) finds that the grain futures 
market is efficient in the semi-strong form and that the use of publicly available information 
available in the COT reports does not generate abnormal returns. Hartzmark (1991) finds 
evidence supporting the view that traders’ futures returns are random and that traders holding 
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large positions do not possess the ability to consistently earn profits. Yet Wang (2001), using a 
trader position-based sentiment index derived from the COT reports in six agricultural futures 
markets finds that noncommercial traders’ sentiment was an indicator of price continuation, 
while commercial traders’ sentiment was an indicator of price reversals and small trader 
sentiment had no impact on market movements. Wang concludes that his results are consistent 
with the hedging pressure theory under which hedgers pay risk premiums to transfer risks in 
futures markets and that large speculators did not possess any superior forecasting ability. 
Buchanan (2001) also finds that the position of large speculators contains valuable information 
for predicting the direction and magnitude of spot price changes in the natural gas market. 
However Sanders, Boris and Manfredo (2004) use Granger causality tests based on the COT 
reports for the crude oil, unleaded gasoline, heating oil and natural gas futures markets to 
investigate the relationship between traders’ positions and prices and find that positive futures 
returns Granger cause increases in the net long positions held by non-commercial traders and 
decreases in the net long positions of commercial traders’. On the other hand, they find no 
evidence that traders’ net long positions had any predictive power in forecasting market 
returns. 
2.2 Commodity Index Traders 
 
If there is no general consensus that the positions of a particular category of traders had a 
significant impact on commodity prices, the debate was revived in 2007-2008 when commodity 
prices reached record levels, leading to a spike in food prices and resulting in social unrest in 
some countries and widespread criticism and heated debates over the role of speculators in 
driving up commodity prices. In particular, some policymakers, economists and market 
participants started to blame commodity index investors for driving up commodity prices, 
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arguing that massive investment inflows into index funds effectively created an artificial demand 
shock which created a speculative bubble in commodity markets. The US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (the “Subcommittee”) released, on June 24, 2009, after a year 
of investigations and hearings, a report which noted that “there is significant and persuasive 
evidence to conclude that these commodity index traders, in the aggregate, were one of the 
major causes of “unwarranted changes” – here, increases – in the price of wheat futures 
contracts relative to the price of wheat in the cash market.” The Subcommittee thus 
recommended the phasing out of the waivers of position limits for commodity index traders and 
to reapply the standard position limits designed to prevent excessive speculation in the wheat 
market. It also recommended that the CFTC analyze other agricultural commodity markets to 
see if commodity index traders caused futures prices to increase as compared to cash prices or 
caused a lack of convergence between the spot and futures markets and to reinstate position 
limits if necessary. Influential testimony from Masters (2008) and a subsequent paper (Masters 
and White, 2008) illustrate well the arguments made by a number of economists and 
policymakers in arguing that massive commodity index investment inflows led to an 
unwarranted price increase in these markets. Essentially, it is argued that large financial 
institutions such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and other institutional 
investors, who were being advised to consider commodities as an investable asset class because 
of historically low correlations with other asset classes such as equities or fixed income, decided 
all of a sudden to pour billions of dollars into commodities futures through the use of relatively 
new financial instruments that allowed investors to take a passive, long-only position in a basket 
of commodities. Studies such as Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Erb and Harvey (2006) 
provided support for institutional investors to consider investing in long-only commodity index 
funds. Masters and White (2008) argue however that large scale investing in commodity index 
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funds through commodity index swaps and the ability of swap dealers to exceed position limits 
because of the exemption granted to them effectively created a new class of speculators – index 
speculators, who they argue, are far more damaging than traditional speculators: while a 
traditional speculator is a liquidity provider and studies the markets and supply and demand 
dynamics to make his bets, an index speculator usually only takes a long-only, long term 
position, and rolls his position forward regardless of supply and demand dynamics, thus pushing 
prices only higher instead of towards their fundamental values. While the Subcommittee’s and 
Masters’ arguments certainly cast a doubt on the effect of commodity index investing on 
commodity prices most of the evidence presented is anecdotal and relies on testimonies and 
opinions as well as correlations between commodity index investment inflows and commodity 
prices. Several academics have criticized Masters’ methods and the Subcommittee’s analysis 
and presented counter arguments and evidence supporting the opposite view – that is, that 
index investing was not the cause of the 2007-2008 run-up in commodity prices and what was 
observed could not be qualified as a bubble (Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2009, 2010a), Sanders 
and Irwin (2011a), Sanders and Irwin (2011b), Irwin Sanders and Merrin (2009), Stoll and Whaley 
(2010), Buyuksahin and Harris (2009), Brunetti and Buyuksahin (2009)).  
One popular argument of the “no-bubble” proponents is that prices increased in the 
2006-2008 period even for commodities which were not represented in commodity indices. 
Irwin, Sanders and Merrin (2009) show for example that similar price increases occurred for 
fluid milk and rice futures, which are not included in commodity indices, and that prices 
increased even for commodities without futures markets – apples and edible beans. Sanders 
and Irwin (2010) test empirically if the relative size of index fund positions is correlated with 
subsequent returns across different markets. Using Fama-MacBeth and traditional cross 
sectional tests, they conclude that index fund positions across futures markets have no impact 
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on relative price changes. Stoll and Whaley (2010) react to the Subcommittee’s conclusion and 
conduct a number of tests including Granger causality tests on the 12 agricultural markets 
included in the CFTC’s Commitments of Traders Commodity Index Trader Supplement (“CIT”) 
report to investigate whether index fund investment flows cause price changes and vice versa. 
They find insufficient evidence of causality in either direction, with cotton being the only market 
in which investment flows Granger-caused futures returns. Counter intuitively, Kansas City 
wheat futures returns Granger-caused commodity index investment flows. Overall, the authors 
conclude that commodity index investment is not speculation and that commodity index rolls 
have little price impact, with index investment inflows and outflows not causing prices to 
change. Similarly, Buyuksahin and Harris (2009), using non-public data from the CFTC over the 
2000-2008 period, employ linear Granger causality tests to test the relationship between crude 
oil prices and the positions of various types of traders. The authors do not find a systematic 
causality relationship from any positions of any category of trader to price changes but find that 
price changes led the net position and net position changes of speculators and commodity swap 
dealers, suggesting that they are, in general, trend followers. In the same vein, Brunetti and 
Buyuksahin (2009) use highly disaggregated non-public daily data from the CFTC to investigate 
whether speculators cause price movements and volatility in futures markets. Using a linear 
Granger-causality framework, the authors look at the NYMEX crude oil and natural gas futures, 
CBOT corn futures, CME Eurodollar futures and CBOT Mini-Dow futures contracts and find that 
in general speculative activity does not cause price movements but that it reduces volatility 
levels. Sanders and Irwin (2011) also test the relationship between commodity index traders’ 
positions and returns for CBOT corn, CBOT soybeans, CBOT wheat and KCBT wheat futures, 
using linear Granger causality tests over the 2004-2009 period. The study contained non-publicly 
available data for the 2004-2005 period for commodity index positions, prior to the spike in 
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commodity prices. Both linear Granger causality tests and long-horizon regressions failed to 
reject the null hypothesis that commodity index traders’ positions do not impact futures prices. 
In a separate study (Sanders and Irwin 2011b), this time using the DCOT report, investigated 
whether positions held by swap dealers, a proxy for index fund investing, impacted returns or 
volatility across 12 agricultural futures markets and 2 energy futures markets. A system of 
bivariate Granger style causality tests failed to detect a causal relationship between commodity 
index traders’ positions and returns while a tendency is found for index traders’ positions to 
lead market volatility, however with a negative sign – that is – index positions lead to lower 
volatility. In a similarly oriented paper, Irwin and Sanders (2010) conduct a test of what they call 
the “Masters hypothesis” using CFTC Index Investment Data (IID) report, arguing that this report 
provides a better measurement of commodity index investment since index investments are 
measured before internal netting by swap dealers. However the IID report is only produced 
quarterly and the study covered the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 
2010. Not surprisingly, cross-sectional regression estimates fail to support Masters’ hypothesis, 
i.e. that commodity index investing has a significant impact on commodity prices. Since 
commodity index funds have been accused by some of causing non-convergence of futures and 
cash commodity prices, Irwin et al. (2011) conduct an event study to test the behavior of 
spreads between futures and cash prices for CBOT corn, wheat and soybeans and perform 
Granger causality tests to see if trader positions had an impact on spreads. They find no 
evidence that index fund rollovers or index fund positions caused spreads to increase. Capelle-
Blancard and Coulibaly (2012) use a panel Granger causality testing approach developed by 
Kònya (2006), which is based on Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and Wald tests with market-
specific bootstrap critical values and which allows testing of each individual market separately 
by taking into account the possible contemporaneous dependence across markets. Using weekly 
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data from the CIT report the tests were applied to 12 commodity futures markets and failed to 
detect a causal relationship between commodity index funds’ positions and commodity futures 
prices. 
If most academic studies to date fail to detect a formal relationship between index fund 
positions and futures returns, some authors have nevertheless provided at least some form of 
evidence that some links exist in certain markets. 
Gilbert (2009) examines whether the high commodity prices of 2006-2008 resulted from 
bubble like behaviour and if commodity index investing had an impact on futures prices. Looking 
specifically at the crude oil, aluminum, copper, nickel, wheat, corn and soybeans markets, he 
finds that index fund investing had a significant impact on returns in the crude oil, aluminum 
and copper markets. However, index fund investing was estimated using a quantum index 
derived from the CFTC’s CIT report (agricultural futures) and subsequently Granger causality 
tests were performed for the seven markets previously mentioned. It seems indeed strange that 
the null hypothesis of non causality was not rejected in the case of the three agricultural 
commodity futures (which were part of the 12 agricultural futures on which the quantum index 
was based) but was rejected for the energy and metals futures. Moreover, the reverse 
hypothesis – that is that futures returns do not Granger-cause index investing, was rejected for 
the agricultural markets. In a subsequent paper, Gilbert (2010) studies the determinants of the 
run-up in food prices in 2006-2008 and shows that index fund investing was a significant factor. 
He sets up a model of the change in food prices as a function of the change in oil prices, the 
exchange rate and a futures investment index. The Granger causality test rejects the null of non 
causality only for the futures investment index. However Gilbert sets up another equation for 
the change in index fund investing as a function of the change in the dollar exchange rate, the 
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current and lagged changes in Chinese industrial production and current and lagged changes in 
the S&P 500 and Hang-Seng stock market indices, the rationale being that investors were 
investing in commodity indices as a means of taking an exposure to the growth in the Chinese 
economy in this period and as a dollar hedge. Gilbert (2010) concludes that index investing was 
a channel rather than a fundamental cause of the increase in food prices over the period. 
Singleton (2011) examines the impact of investor flows and financial market conditions on 
returns in crude-oil futures markets and finds that commodity index fund flows are positively 
correlated with future changes in commodity prices. His findings are similar to Tang and Xiong 
(2010) who find an increasing trend of financialization of commodities markets with increasing 
correlation among commodities and among commodities and other financial assets. 
2.3 New approaches to causality testing 
 
Since its introduction more than four decades ago Granger causality (Granger, 1969) has 
been widely used by academics and practitioners in time series data analysis in fields as 
different as economics, biology, medicine and meteorology. While Granger’s formal definition of 
causality does not make any assumption on the underlying data generation process, in practice 
Granger causality testing is generally conducted using a linear framework, whose simplicity, 
adaptability and ease of use contributed to its popularity. Criticism of the linear approach to 
causality testing mainly revolves around the low power of such tests in detecting certain types 
of non linear causal relationships (Hiemstra and Jones, 1994). Although several nonlinear 
extensions to linear Granger causality have been explored (Liu and Bahadori, 2012), namely 
kernelized regression and other non-parametric approaches, semi-parametric approaches  and 
latent variable models, empirical research has mostly focused on the non parametric approach. 
Baek and Brock (1992) proposed a general test for nonlinear Granger causality based on 
13 
 
correlation integrals. The test had the ability to detect causal relationships that could not be 
detected using a linear approach.  Hiemstra and Jones (1994) used a modified and improved 
version of the Baek and Brock test to uncover bidirectional nonlinear causality between the Dow 
Jones stock returns and percentage changes in New York Stock Exchange trading volume. The 
Hiemstra and Jones (“HJ”) test has been used in a number of academic finance and economics 
papers, however Diks and Panchenko (2006) showed that the HJ test suffered from over 
rejection problems with increasing sample size. The authors propose a new test that avoids the 
over rejection problem of the HJ test and has good size and power characteristics. Although only 
developed in 2006, the Diks and Panchenko test has been used by a number of authors on 
economic and financial time series (Qiao et al. (2008), Hernandez and Torero (2010), Rosa and 
Vasciaveo (2012), Benhmad (2013)). 
III Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Causality in general 
 
The notion of causality has been central to philosophical debates since antiquity and 
discussion around the definition of causality and its detection continue today. However, in 
econometrics and science in general, causality is often referred to and sought under a Granger 
causality framework. Granger, whose work on methods of analyzing economic time series was 
recognized by the Nobel prize in Economics in 2003, formalized a definition of causality in the 
context of economic time series and developed a framework for causality testing. Granger’s 




Using Granger’s (1969) notation, assume 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  is a stationary stochastic process and ?̅?𝐴𝑡𝑡  the 
set of past values {𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … ,∞}. Let the optimum, unbiased, least squares predictor of 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  using the set of values 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  be 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵), the predicted error series be 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) 
and 𝜎𝜎2(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) be the variance of 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵). 
 For two stationary time series 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  and with 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡  representing all the information in 
the universe accumulated since time t-1 and 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 −  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  all this information except 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  then if 
𝜎𝜎2(𝑋𝑋|𝑈𝑈) < 𝜎𝜎2(𝑋𝑋|𝑈𝑈 − 𝑌𝑌��������), 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  is causing 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 .  
This definition is very general and only says that 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  is causing 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  if the addition of 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  to the 
information universe results in a better prediction of 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 . Note that this does not imply that 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  
causes 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  in the more general meaning of the word causation – it just says that the addition of 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  to the information universe results in a better prediction. In reality, a third phenomenon 
could cause both 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡   and 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  or there might be several reasons for 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  being a good predictor of 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 .  
3.2 The linear model 
 
In economics and finance there is often no reason to assume that the relationship 
between two time series is linear, yet the linear model provides a convenient, easy way of 
modeling and uncovering basic relationships which led to its widespread use.  
Under the linear model, for two stationary time series 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  with zero mean and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  
and 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡  two uncorrelated white noise series:  
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1   
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1         (3.1) 
15 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  is Granger causing 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  if some 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0 and 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  is Granger causing 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  if some 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0 and if both 
some 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0 and some 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0 then bidirectional causality or feedback exists between 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 . 
To test for Granger causality under this framework, a standard joint  𝐹𝐹 or χ2 test for the 
coefficients  𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗  or 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗  being jointly 0 is employed, with the null hypothesis of non Granger 
causality being rejected if the coefficients 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗  or 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗  are jointly significantly different from 0. 
Although in theory  𝑚𝑚 could go to infinity, in practice only a limited number of lags are used with 
𝑚𝑚 less than the time series’ length. 
3.3 The nonlinear model 
 
Despite its widespread use and sufficiency in a large number of real world situations, the 
linear model can fail to uncover certain causal relationships or lead to the wrong conclusions 
when the time series studied present significant nonlinear components. Granger (1989) admits 
that univariate and multivariate nonlinear models represent the proper way to model a real 
world that is “almost certainly nonlinear”. Recent research in econometrics and finance has 
been focused on developing and applying nonlinear methods (Baek and Brock (1992), Hiemstra 
and Jones (1994), Bell et al. (1996), Chen et al. (2004), Diks and Panchenko (2006), Péguin-
Feissolle et al. (2013)). The Diks and Panchenko test used here was proposed by Diks and 
Panchenko (2006) and came as a response to the more frequently used Hiemstra and Jones 
(1994) test which was shown to suffer from severe over rejection problems, with rejection 
probabilities of the null hypothesis of non causality tending to one as the sample size increased 
(Diks and Panchenko, 2005). 
In general, non-parametric extensions of the linear Granger causality model rely on some 
functionals 𝜃𝜃(. ) of two conditional distributions 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 |𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 |(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ,𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ) where 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  and 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  are 
time series of finite lags 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  respectively. The null hypothesis being tested is: 
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𝐻𝐻0:        𝜃𝜃 �𝐹𝐹�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �� = 𝜃𝜃 �𝐹𝐹�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡�(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ,𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 )��        (3.2) 
To use the notation used by Diks and Panchenko (2006) let 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 and 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 =(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ,𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡). Testing for conditional independence is equivalent to making a statement about 
the invariant distribution of 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 . Dropping the time index and considering only the case in which 
𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 1  for brevity, then 𝑊𝑊 = (𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍) denotes a three variate random variable, 
distributed as  𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1). 
Under the null hypothesis of non Granger causality, the conditional distribution of 𝑍𝑍 given (𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌) = (𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙) is the same as that of 𝑍𝑍 given 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑙𝑙 only so the joint probability density function 
𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙, 𝑧𝑧) and its marginals must satisfy: 
𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌 ,𝑍𝑍(𝑙𝑙 ,𝑙𝑙 ,𝑧𝑧)
𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙 ,𝑙𝑙) = 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌 ,𝑍𝑍 (𝑙𝑙 ,𝑧𝑧)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙)         (3.3) 
Or equivalently: 
𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌 ,𝑍𝑍 (𝑙𝑙 ,𝑙𝑙 ,𝑧𝑧)
𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙) = 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙 ,𝑙𝑙)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙) 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌 ,𝑍𝑍 (𝑙𝑙 ,𝑧𝑧)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙)        (3.4) 
By adding a positive weight function 𝑔𝑔(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙, 𝑧𝑧) Diks and Panchenko show that the null implies  
𝑞𝑞 = 𝐸𝐸[(𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌 ,𝑍𝑍 (𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍)
𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑌𝑌) − 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙) 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌 ,𝑍𝑍 (𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑌𝑌) )𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍)] = 0    (3.5) 
where the weight function 𝑔𝑔(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙, 𝑧𝑧) was chosen so that 𝑔𝑔(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙, 𝑧𝑧) = 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌2(𝑙𝑙)1 , therefore the 
functional 𝑞𝑞 becomes: 
1 Diks and Panchenko (2006) considered three functions for the weight function g, namely 𝑔𝑔1(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙, 𝑧𝑧) =
𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙),  𝑔𝑔2(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙, 𝑧𝑧) = 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌2(𝑙𝑙) and   𝑔𝑔3(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙, 𝑧𝑧) = 𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙)/𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌(𝑙𝑙,𝑙𝑙). 𝑔𝑔2 was chosen because of stability in 
empirical studies and the ability of its estimator to be represented as a U-statistic, which allowed for an 




                                                            
𝑞𝑞 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑌𝑌) − 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍(𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍)] = 0     (3.6) 
A natural estimator of 𝑞𝑞 based on indicator functions is: 
𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛(𝜀𝜀) = (𝑛𝑛−1)𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛−2)∑ (𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖) − 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖)𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖))𝑖𝑖    (3.7) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖) = (2𝜀𝜀)−𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛−1  ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗 ,𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖  is the local density estimator of a 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊  variate random vector 
𝑊𝑊 at 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖  and 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑊𝑊 = 𝐼𝐼(�𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗� < 𝜀𝜀). In order to derive an asymptotic distribution of 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛  a form 
of kernel density estimation was used, which is a non-parametric technique to estimate the 
probability density function of a random variable. The technique is conceptually similar to using 
a histogram but provides better results. It involves using a kernel which is a weighting function 
and a parameter or “bandwidth” or “smoothing constant”. The kernel determines the shape of 
the smoothing function and the bandwidth the amount of smoothing applied. 
Diks and Panchenko show that for a sequence of bandwidths depending on sample size as 





→  𝑁𝑁(0,1)        (3.8) 
The authors provide practical guidelines for choosing the bandwidth which, in applications can 
be truncated by taking 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛 = max⁡(𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛−27, 1.5)with 𝐶𝐶 ≃ 8 for an application to unfiltered financial 
returns data assuming an underlying ARCH process of the form 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑎𝑎𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−12 ) with 








This study uses the CFTC’s supplemental COT report, often referred to as the “CIT” report 
for Commodity Index Traders report, since the report provides in a separate category the 
positions of commodity index traders in 12 physical commodity futures markets. As part of its 
ongoing reviews and efforts to provide the public with useful information relating to the futures 
and options markets, the CFTC released in 2006 a request for comments regarding the COT 
reports entitled “Comprehensive Review of the Commitments of Traders Reporting Program”. 
As a result of the agency receiving 4,659 comments, the largest number of comments it ever 
received in its 31 year history, it decided to publish the CIT weekly report which was to show 
aggregate futures and options positions of Noncommercial, Commercial, and Index Traders in 12 
selected agricultural futures markets. The rationale behind the release of this report was that 
the futures market composition changed over time and the traditional categories of Commercial 
and Noncommercial traders could no longer provide an accurate representation of the market 
participants who were actually producers, traders or users of the physical commodities. In 
addition, commodity index traders accounted for a significant portion of the market yet their 
activities were hidden by appearing in both the Commercial and Noncommercial categories. As 
such, the new commodity index trader category was formed by drawing from the 
Noncommercial category the positions of pension funds, managed funds and other investors 
seeking exposure to commodity prices as an asset class in a passive manner and from the 
Commercial category the positions of swap dealers who used futures contracts to hedge their 
over the counter exposures with investors such as pension funds. Although the CIT report only 
provides data going back to 2006 and is limited to 12 agricultural futures markets (CBOT wheat, 
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corn, soybeans, soybean oil, KCBOT wheat, ICE cotton, cocoa, coffee and sugar, and CME lean 
hogs, live cattle and feeder cattle) it provides a good estimate of the activity of commodity index 
traders and is helpful in analyzing the more general question of whether commodity prices are 
affected by massive inflows from this category of traders. One limitation of the CIT is however 
that the index investors’ positions derived from swap dealers are net positions, since swap 
dealers use internal netting and the ultimate counterparties are unknown. However, particularly 
in the case of agricultural commodities, most swap dealers positions are long-only futures 
positions as they mostly take short OTC swap positions against pension funds or other 
commodity index investors. 
The period covered is from January 3rd, 2006 to December 31, 2012 which includes 366 
weekly observations. 
Price data for the 12 CIT agricultural commodity futures was obtained from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream. Since futures contracts expire, the price series used in this study are 
perpetual series of futures prices which means that prices are based on individual futures 
contracts with switching based on a pre determined methodology. The roll method used here 
was the rollover based on a weighted volume of 1st month and 2nd month. This means that the 
series starts at the nearest contract month and once that month is reached a volume weighting 
calculation is made between the near and next nearest contract months and is applied to prices 
until the near contract reaches expiration, at which point the next nearest contract becomes the 
nearest and its price is then used. This method avoids having a sharp change in the price series 




Table 1 presents open interest and commodity index traders’ positions statistics for the 
12 agricultural futures markets studied. Note that total open interest varied quite significantly 
over the study period, with recorded open interest highs being 2.1 to 3.3 times as high as the 
corresponding lows for a given contract over the study period. Note also that almost all 
commodity index traders’ positions are long which is consistent with commodity index traders 
being mostly passive investors. It is interesting to note that the total share of commodity index 
traders in the market is not the same for all 12 agricultural futures markets studied: commodity 
index traders’ net positions represented on average 38.4% of open interest for lean hogs futures 
but only 14.5% of open interest for cocoa. It is also interesting to observe that the share 
attributed to commodity index traders has been relatively volatile, with standard deviations of 
5% on average. 
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Table 2 provides basic price and returns statistics for the 12 agricultural futures markets 
considered here. As expected, prices fluctuated in a wide range over the study period and 


































Wheat - Chicago 
Board of Trade         511         313         723         213           25         188         127         230 37.3% 28.1% 51.0% 4.4%
Wheat - Kansas  Ci ty 
Board of Trade         150           81         263           36              2           33           16           53 22.9% 12.3% 34.2% 5.1%
Corn - Chicago Board 
of Trade      1,733         997      2,574         422           45         376         224         504 22.2% 13.2% 32.7% 4.3%
Soybeans  - Chicago 
Board of Trade         692         379      1,260         171           21         150           90         201 22.7% 9.7% 32.2% 4.7%
Soybean oi l  - Chicago 
Board of Trade         337         211         503           87              9           79           37         114 23.4% 14.2% 36.5% 3.8%
Lean Hogs  - Chicago 
Mercanti le Exchange         227         132         349           89              4           85           46         127 38.4% 27.0% 51.4% 5.5%
Live Cattle - Chicago 
Mercanti le Exchange         339         219         490         120              3         117           61         157 35.1% 25.3% 47.0% 5.5%
Feeder Cattle - 
Chicago Mercanti le 
Exchange
          37           21           62              8              1              8              5           11 22.1% 12.1% 35.2% 5.0%
Cotton no. 2 - ICE 
futures  U.S.         280         149         573           80              6           74           43         123 27.8% 10.9% 43.1% 6.9%
Cocoa - ICE futures  
U.S.         162         116         248           26              2           24              5           40 14.5% 4.2% 22.2% 4.1%
Sugar no. 11 - ICE 
futures  U.S.         922         604      1,535         267           56         211         106         393 23.0% 10.0% 32.8% 5.3%
Coffee c - ICE futures  




Commodity Index Traders' Positions 
(in thousands)
Commodity Index Traders' Positions as 
a % of Open Interest
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 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Futures Prices and Returns (2006-2012) 
 
 
4.2 Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
4.2.1 Specification 
To investigate the relationship between index traders’ positions and commodity futures 
prices, I argue that one should not look at index traders’ positions in absolute value but rather 
relative to total open interest. Previous research efforts have focused on discovering the impact 
of commodity index traders’ positions on prices. Or, for the purposes of causality testing, the 
time series need to be stationary which is almost never the case with price time series and only 
occasionally with traders’ positions time series, so most researchers use returns and position 
Avg. Price 
over 















Wheat - Chicago Board of 
Trade
632           329           1,223       174           0.2% -17.6% 18.7% 5.2%
Wheat - Kansas  Ci ty Board of 
Trade
673           372           1,261       179           0.2% -16.4% 14.8% 4.7%
Corn - Chicago Board of 
Trade
477           209           831           166           0.3% -16.5% 18.9% 4.9%
Soybeans  - Chicago Board of 
Trade
1,095       537           1,768       291           0.3% -14.6% 10.7% 3.9%
Soybean oi l  - Chicago Board 
of Trade
43             22             69             11             0.3% -10.9% 16.1% 3.8%
Lean Hogs  - Chicago 
Mercanti le Exchange
72             45             103           12             0.1% -16.1% 16.6% 4.0%
Live Cattle - Chicago 
Mercanti le Exchange
99             75             133           14             0.1% -8.1% 7.3% 2.1%
Feeder Cattle - Chicago 
Mercanti le Exchange
116           87             161           19             0.1% -7.9% 8.0% 2.1%
Cotton no. 2 - ICE futures  U.S. 77             39             207           34             0.1% -35.8% 16.2% 5.2%
Cocoa - ICE futures  U.S. 2,418       1,403       3,633       566           0.1% -16.7% 14.3% 4.4%
Sugar no. 11 - ICE futures  U.S. 18             9               33             6               0.1% -14.5% 14.9% 4.9%





changes. The problem is that by only looking at the change in positions and ignoring what is 
happening to total open interest, one could draw the wrong conclusions in terms of cause and 
effect. For example, assume that one finds that changes in commodity index traders’ positions 
Granger cause returns. Let’s also assume that over the same period, the total open interest of a 
particular futures contract increased more than the total positions of commodity index traders 
and that the changes in total open interest also Granger cause returns. The finding then that the 
changes in commodity index traders’ positions Granger caused returns might be misleading 
because a third factor might have caused all investors to invest more resulting in a higher 
demand for futures contracts, a larger market (in terms of outstanding contracts) and higher 
prices. As such, I argue that one should look at the change in commodity index traders’ positions 
relative to the total open interest and compare this change to returns. 
I also argue that for the purposes of this study, commodity index traders’ positions should 
be taken as the net number of contracts (long less shorts) reported in the CIT report and not be 
multiplied by the contemporaneous futures prices to obtain a dollar value for commodity index 
investing (Stoll and Whaley, 2010), as this would create a feedback loop and would lead to 
spurious causality test results. 
4.2.2 General observations  
The following graphs show the evolution of commodity index traders’ positions as well as 
of total open interest relative to prices. Note that both open interest and net commodity index 
trader’s positions often tend to follow the same patterns as prices, which seems to indicate that 
some sort of relationship exists between these variables. In addition, it appears that both 
commodity index investors’ positions and open interest follow the same overall trends, which is 
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consistent with the theory that investors are herding or that other factors determine investment 
flows. 
Exhibit 1: Futures Prices versus Open Interest and Net Commodity Index Traders’ positions on a Weekly Basis over 











































































































































































































































































































































































































The following charts show futures prices compared to commodity index investment 
expressed as a percentage of total open interest. There is no clear indication that one influences 
the other even if at times, for shorter periods, some positive / negative correlation between the 
series can be discerned. 
Exhibit 2: Commodity Index Traders’ Positions as a Percentage of Open Interest Relative to Price on a Weekly Basis 















































































































































































































































































































































4.2.3 Causality Tests 
To investigate whether commodity index investing was a determinant of the 2006-2008 
spike in commodity prices I conduct three batteries of tests. First I apply the standard linear 
Granger causality test using a VAR approach, then I apply the Diks and Panchenko test to the 
residuals of the VAR equations (assuming only nonlinear effects are left) and finally I apply the 
Diks and Panchencko test to the raw time series, namely the weekly change in commodity index 
trader’s positions as a percentage of total open interest and the weekly futures price returns. 
Ideally, to find if index investing was a determinant of the increase in commodity futures 
prices, one should look at the raw time series, i.e. on one hand the percentage that commodity 
index traders’ positions represent for a given futures contract’s total open interest and on the 
other hand the price of the given futures contract. However, as Granger causality testing 
requires the underlying data to be stationary, two tests were performed, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test in which the null hypothesis is that the time series has a unit root and the 
Kwiatkowski-Philips-Schmidt-Shin (“KPSS”) test in which the null hypothesis is that the series is 
stationary. The tests were performed for each futures contract, for both the weekly commodity 
index traders’ positions as a percentage of total open interest and for weekly prices as well as 
for the first differenced series, which are the change in the weekly commodity index traders’ 
positions as a percentage of total open interest and the weekly change in prices. The results are 
presented in Table 3: 
36 
 
Table 3: Stationarity Tests – Weekly Commodity Index Traders’ Positions as a Percentage of Open Interest (and 
weekly changes) and Weekly Futures Prices (and returns) – 2006-2012 
 
 
Note that all prices time series are not stationary and only half of the index traders’ net 
positions as a percent of total open interest are stationary. After differencing, all series are 
stationary. 
4.2.3.1 Causality Tests – Linear Tests and Diks and Panchenko Test applied to the VAR 
residuals 
The linear Granger causality tests were performed to test the following null hypotheses: 
1. The change in the weekly commodity index traders’ positions as a percentage of 
total open interest does not Granger cause the weekly change in futures prices. 
2. The weekly change in futures prices does not Granger cause the change in the 












t-Stat.  Prob t-Stat.  Prob t-Stat.  Prob t-Stat.  Prob LM-Stat. LM-Stat. LM-Stat. LM-Stat.
Wheat CBOT -5.210 0.000 -17.121 0.000 -2.242 0.192 -19.205 0.000 0.364 0.086 0.486 0.097
Wheat KS -2.415 0.138 -17.129 0.000 -2.120 0.237 -18.743 0.000 0.494 0.058 0.513 0.090
Corn CBOT -2.987 0.037 -13.932 0.000 -1.498 0.534 -20.383 0.000 0.154 0.062 1.516 0.084
Soybeans -2.384 0.147 -6.353 0.000 -1.854 0.354 -19.293 0.000 0.772 0.237 1.375 0.115
Soybean Oil -3.856 0.003 -28.569 0.000 -2.020 0.278 -18.448 0.000 0.245 0.130 0.983 0.191
Lean Hogs -2.423 0.136 -19.317 0.000 -2.066 0.259 -17.763 0.000 1.685 0.036 1.391 0.038
Live Cattle -2.299 0.173 -5.401 0.000 -0.450 0.897 -20.117 0.000 1.013 0.248 1.581 0.169
Feeder Cattle -3.673 0.005 -16.524 0.000 -0.545 0.879 -18.618 0.000 0.584 0.054 1.447 0.183
Cotton ICE -3.368 0.013 -15.253 0.000 -1.585 0.489 -18.728 0.000 0.737 0.080 1.002 0.105
Cocoa ICE -3.161 0.023 -14.730 0.000 -2.175 0.216 -18.761 0.000 1.579 0.061 1.311 0.250
Sugar -2.527 0.110 -16.350 0.000 -1.470 0.548 -19.355 0.000 0.327 0.067 1.542 0.090
Coffee ICE -3.078 0.029 -17.003 0.000 -1.488 0.539 -19.546 0.000 0.262 0.044 1.434 0.155
Null Hypothesis: Has unit root
KPSS
Null Hypothesis: is stationary
CIT Positions % of 
OI
CIT Positions % of 




The following vector autoregressive (VAR) model was set up and block exogeneity Wald 
tests were conducted to test the null hypothesis each of the 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 = 0 and of all 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 = 0 : 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1   
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1      (4.1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  is the weekly logarithmic return and 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡  is the change in the weekly commodity index 
traders’ positions as a percentage of total open interest and 𝑙𝑙 is the number of lags chosen. 
The VAR model order was selected over lags 1 to 4 weeks using the Schwarz information 
criterion. Lagrange multiplier tests were conducted for residual autocorrelations and if detected, 
the VAR order was increased by the necessary number of lags to eliminate the autocorrelation. 
In a second step, the Diks and Panchenko test was performed on the residuals of the first 
VAR model specification with the underlying model assuming the same number of lags as the 
original VAR model. The bandwidth was set at 1.5, based on sample size. 
Table 4 presents the results of the linear Granger causality tests as well as the results of 




Table 4: Results of the  Linear Granger Causality and Diks and Panchenko Tests Applied to VAR Residuals 
 
According to the linear test, the hypothesis of non causality running from the weekly 
changes in commodity index traders’ net positions as a percentage of total open interest to the 
weekly returns, can be rejected at the 5% level for 3 commodity futures contracts, namely lean 
hogs, cotton and coffee and at the 10% level for CBOT wheat and sugar as well. It is interesting 
to find that in the case of soybeans, causality runs in the opposite direction, i.e. price changes 
Granger cause changes in commodity index traders’ positions as a percentage of total open 
interest. It is also interesting to note that in the case of lean hogs there is some weak evidence 
of price changes Granger causing changes in commodity index traders’ positions as a percentage 










Wheat CBOT (1,1) 3.035 0.08* 1.134 0.29 1.112 0.13 2.225 0.01**
Wheat KS (1,1) 0.267 0.61 0.536 0.46 0.409 0.34 -0.073 0.53
Corn CBOT (1,1) 0.261 0.61 1.117 0.29 -0.030 0.51 0.804 0.21
Soybeans (4,4) 7.266 0.12 11.267 0.02** -0.698 0.76 -0.580 0.72
Soybean Oil (4,4) 6.447 0.17 2.357 0.67 -0.260 0.60 -0.659 0.75
Lean Hogs (3,3) 10.924 0.01** 6.396 0.09* -0.549 0.71 0.191 0.42
Live Cattle (1,1) 0.841 0.36 0.058 0.81 -1.128 0.87 1.265 0.10
Feeder Cattle (1,1) 2.061 0.15 1.436 0.23 1.315 0.09* 0.150 0.44
Cotton ICE (4,4) 14.583 0.01** 3.812 0.43 1.983 0.02** -1.081 0.86
Cocoa ICE (3,3) 3.831 0.28 6.041 0.11 0.915 0.18 1.050 0.15
Sugar (1,1) 3.304 0.07* 0.707 0.40 1.501 0.07* -2.782 1.00
Coffee ICE (3,3) 9.867 0.02** 0.496 0.92 0.801 0.21 -0.242 0.60
Causal Relationship
Changes in CIT net 
positions as a % of 
total OI -> 
commodity price 
changes
 Commodity price 
changes -> Changes 
in CIT net positios 
as a % of total OI
Diks & Panchenko (residuals)
Causal Relationship
Changes in CIT net 
positions as a % of 
total OI -> 
commodity price 
changes
 Commodity price 
changes -> Changes 
in CIT net positios 




The Diks and Panchenko test, as applied to the residuals of the underlying VAR models 
used in the previous linear tests provides some interesting results. First of all, in the case of 
CBOT wheat, contrary to the linear test, evidence is found for returns Granger causing changes 
in commodity index traders’ positions, which suggests that the linear test failed to reject the 
hypothesis of non-causality because of non-linear effects. Given that the linear test found some 
weak evidence of commodity index traders’ positions Granger causing returns (no additional 
nonlinear effects were found by the Diks and Panchenko test) this tends to suggest the 
relationship might be bidirectional. 
 Second, the Diks and Panchenko test as applied to the VAR residuals, confirms the 
causality relationship highlighted by the linear test for cotton and sugar, which again suggests 
that the linear test failed to uncover some nonlinear causal effects.  
 Given the fact that the causality test results presented here are not homogeneous across 
the family of commodities studied, it is hard to conclude overall that changes in commodity 
index traders’ positions Granger cause commodity futures returns or vice versa. Furthermore 
the results are not consistent relative to the percentage of total open interest represented by 
index investors. For example, the live cattle contract has a relatively high percentage of 
commodity index traders’ positions as a percentage of open interest (averages of 35.1%) yet, no 
causality relationship is detected in either direction. 
4.2.3.2 Causality Tests - Diks and Panchenko tests (raw data) 
In a third step, the Diks and Panchenko test is performed on the raw stationary series. As 
there is no lag selection criterion for the Diks and Panchenko test, the test was performed for 
lags of 1 up to 4 weeks. The bandwidth was set to 1.5 based on sample size.  
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Commodity Lags Test Statistic p-value Test Statistic p-value
Wheat CBOT 1 1.281 0.100 2.085 0.02**
2 0.484 0.314 1.548 0.06*
3 -0.619 0.732 1.438 0.08*
4 -1.138 0.872 1.451 0.07*
Wheat KS 1 0.521 0.301 -0.172 0.568
2 0.233 0.408 -0.311 0.622
3 0.027 0.489 -0.388 0.651
4 -0.350 0.637 -0.855 0.804
Corn CBOT 1 0.086 0.466 1.012 0.157
2 0.466 0.321 0.467 0.320
3 -0.800 0.788 -0.521 0.699
4 -0.807 0.790 -0.372 0.645
Soybeans 1 1.525 0.06* 0.965 0.167
2 1.524 0.06* 0.789 0.215
3 1.132 0.129 0.181 0.428
4 0.113 0.455 -0.850 0.802
Soybean Oil 1 0.098 0.461 0.061 0.476
2 -0.327 0.628 -0.648 0.741
3 -0.642 0.740 -0.949 0.829
4 -0.465 0.679 -0.557 0.711
Lean Hogs 1 -0.176 0.570 2.001 0.02**
2 -0.231 0.591 1.425 0.08*
3 -0.191 0.576 0.661 0.254
4 0.286 0.388 0.448 0.327
Causal Relationship
Changes in CIT net positions as 
a % of total OI -> commodity 
price changes
 Commodity price changes -> 
Changes in CIT net positios as a 
% of total OI
Diks & Panchenko (raw data)
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 In theory, the test should report results consistent with the linear test results if the 
relationship is linear and report somewhat different results for the situations in which nonlinear 
effects were previously reported. The results are again interesting: the test finds strong 
evidence for causality running from commodity index trader’s positions to returns in the case of 
cotton, cocoa and sugar and finds weak evidence for soybeans and coffee. Contrary to the linear 
test no such evidence is found for lean hogs and CBOT wheat.  Also contrary to the linear test 
but consistent with the Diks and Panchenko test applied to the VAR residuals, the test finds 
evidence for returns Granger causing commodity index traders’ positions changes as a percent 
Commodity Lags Test Statistic p-value Test Statistic p-value
Live Cattle 1 -1.181 0.881 0.910 0.181
2 -0.821 0.794 1.121 0.131
3 -1.600 0.945 0.653 0.257
4 -1.959 0.975 0.287 0.387
Feeder Cattle 1 1.224 0.111 0.563 0.287
2 1.207 0.114 0.404 0.343
3 0.065 0.474 -0.172 0.568
4 0.236 0.407 -0.175 0.569
Cotton ICE 1 1.221 0.111 -0.278 0.610
2 1.990 0.02** -1.277 0.899
3 2.134 0.02** -1.312 0.905
4 1.642 0.05* -1.147 0.874
Cocoa ICE 1 1.725 0.04** 1.577 0.06*
2 0.877 0.190 0.976 0.164
3 1.005 0.158 0.593 0.277
4 1.291 0.10* 0.895 0.185
Sugar 1 1.598 0.06* -2.484 0.994
2 1.899 0.03** -0.315 0.624
3 1.870 0.03** 1.099 0.136
4 1.769 0.04** 1.023 0.153
Coffee ICE 1 0.240 0.405 0.406 0.342
2 1.128 0.130 -0.185 0.574
3 1.325 0.09* -0.243 0.596
4 1.290 0.10* 0.035 0.486
Changes in CIT net positions as 
a % of total OI -> commodity 
price changes
Causal Relationship
 Commodity price changes -> 
Changes in CIT net positios as a 
% of total OI
Diks & Panchenko (raw data)
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of open interest for CBOT wheat. Again, this tends to suggest that the linear test failed to 
discover causality in a setting where the underlying relationship is of a non-linear nature.  
Overall, the Diks and Panchenko test applied to the raw data series suggests that at least 
for some commodities, there is a relationship between commodities index investing and returns 
and vice versa. However, no relationship was found for Kansas wheat, corn, soybean oil, live 
cattle and feeder cattle. In addition, the cause and effect relationship intensities do not seem to 
be stronger or weaker for markets in which commodity index traders have a higher or lower 
participation, so it is hard to generally conclude that over the studied period commodity index 
investors were the driving force behind the spike in commodity futures prices. 
V Conclusion 
 
This study investigated whether commodity index investment flows had an impact on 
commodity futures prices in the 2006 – 2012 period and adopted a non-linear approach to 
causality testing. More precisely, three batteries of tests were applied to test the causal 
relationship between the weekly changes in the commodity index traders’ positions as a 
percentage of total open interest and weekly returns for 12 agricultural futures markets. First, a 
linear Granger causality test was conducted and then the non-linear, non-parametric Diks and 
Panchenko test was applied to the VAR residuals of the first test and subsequently the Diks and 
Panchenko test was applied directly to the raw time series. 
Overall, the evidence supporting the hypothesis that massive commodity index investing 
caused a spike in commodity futures prices is mixed. Although for certain markets the null 
hypothesis of non causality was rejected by the tests for other markets it could not be rejected 
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and the relationship did not seem to be stronger with a strong presence of commodity index 
investing in a given market. In addition, the results of the tests suggest that in certain cases 
index investing is actually following price returns, and that in some cases the relationship is 
bidirectional. 
It is interesting to note that the linear approach to Granger causality testing failed to 
uncover a causal relationship when the non-linear model did not or led to the conclusion that a 
causal relationship existed when the non-linear model failed to reject the null of non-causality. 
This is perhaps not surprising as it is expected that the linear model will not perform well when 
coping with non-linear effects, yet it is typical for researchers, especially in the fields of finance 
and economics to assume the most important effects are linear and neglect, by an abuse of 
language “non-linearities”. From this perspective, I argue that the use of linear Granger causality 
testing with financial time series for which the true causal relationship is unknown (if any) can 
lead at times to spurious results. This is not to say that the linear approach cannot be reliably 
used, however under certain circumstances, particularly where extremely volatile data such as 
traders’ positions and returns time series are present, the linear model can lead to unwarranted 
conclusions. I believe more work needs to be done to assess the reliability of the underlying 
models used in Granger causality testing in empirical finance and would like to orient future 
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